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Abstract
Many ﬁnancial applications, such as risk analysis and derivatives pricing, depend
on time scaling of risk. A common method for this purpose, though only correct
when returns are iid normal, is the square–root–of–time rule where an estimated
quantile of a return distribution is scaled to a lower frequency by the square-root
of the time horizon. The aim of this paper is to examine time scaling of risk
when returns follow a jump diﬀusion process. It is argued that a jump diﬀusion
is well-suited for the modeling of systemic risk, which is the raison d’eˆtre of
the Basel capital adequacy proposals. We demonstrate that the square–root–
of–time rule leads to a systematic underestimation of risk, whereby the degree
of underestimation worsens with the time horizon, the jump intensity and the
conﬁdence level. As a result, even if the square–root–of–time rule has widespread
applications in the Basel Accords, it fails to address the objective of the Accords.
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1 Introduction
The square–root–of–time rule is commonly assumed when ﬁnancial risk is time aggre-
gated whereby high frequency risk estimates are scaled to a lower frequency T by the
multiplication of
√
T . One common application of the square–root–of–time rule is the
time scaling of volatilities, such as in the Black–Scholes equation where the T–period
volatility is given by σ
√
T . To take another example, a standard method for esti-
mating quantiles, and in particular value–at–risk1 (VaR), is by estimating a one day
VaR and multiplying it by
√
10. Indeed, this is the method recommended by banking
supervisors (see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996), and is widely
used throughout the ﬁnancial industry. But VaR has not just found prominence via
the external Basel regulations, it has eﬀectively become a cornerstone of internal risk
management systems in ﬁnancial institutions following the success of the J.P. Morgan
RiskMetrics system. For instance VaR and related measures are used to control, and
set limits to, traders’ positions.
The underlying distributional assumptions behind this method are quite stringent, and
are violated in most, if not all, practical applications. Since the distributional stylized
facts for returns are well documented, the reason for the prevalence of the square–root–
of–time rule must be a scarcity of robust alternative methods coupled with a lack of
understanding of the shortcomings of the square–root–of–time rule. Below we formally
analyze the biases introduced by the square–root–of–time rule applied to quantiles
when asset returns are driven by a jump diﬀusion. We demonstrate that the square–
root–of–time rule leads to a systematic underestimation of risk, whereby the degree of
underestimation worsens with the time horizon, the jump intensity and the conﬁdence
level.
The time scaling of volatilities for instance implicitly depends on returns being iid
(identically and independently distributed), an assumption Engle (1982) argues is in-
correct because of the presence of volatility clusters. When applied to quantiles, the
square–root–of–time rule also depends on the normality of returns. It has been known
at least since Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) that returns exhibit excess kurtosis,
e.g. they are “fat tailed.” In general, the presence of fat tails introduces an additional
bias in applications of the square–root–of–time rule2 to quantile forecasts, such as in
1VaR is the quantile that solves  =
∫ −VaR
−∞ f̂(x)dx, where f̂(x) is the estimated probability density
function of a ﬁnancial institution’s return and  is the conﬁdence level, say .01. The reason we write
-VaR in the above equation is that VaR represents a critical potential loss, and we ﬁnd it more intuitive
to think about a loss as of a positive number.
2If returns are conditionally normal but with volatility clusters, the square–root–of–time rule may
either over or underestimate quantile forecasts, (see e.g. Drost and Nijman, 1993). If returns follow an
unconditionally iid fat tailed distribution, then the square–root–of–time rule overestimates quantile
forecasts, see e.g. Feller (1971, VIII.8) and Dacorogna et al. (1999) for more on this. If returns are
fat tailed with volatility clusters the square–root–of–time rule may either over or underestimate the
2
the pricing of path dependent derivatives and in risk management. For example, in
the pricing of barrier derivatives, a violation of iid normality implies that the knock-
out and knockin probabilities are diﬀerent from what is assumed by standard pricing
models. It is in risk management, however, that violations of iid normality may have
the strongest impact. In this paper, we shall show that under reasonable assumptions,
the square–root–of–time rule applied to VaR underestimates the true VaR, and can do
so by a very substantial margin. This result is reminiscent of Ju and Pearson (1999),
where the estimated VaR underpredicts the true VaR because of superior information
possessed by the trader vis-a`-vis the historically estimated VaR. If the trader knows
that the estimated VaR lies below the true VaR, she takes on more risk than allowed by
the (true) VaR risk limit. In our paper, underestimation arises from statistical reasons.
In order to measure the bias introduced by the square–root–of–time rule, a data gen-
erating process needs to be speciﬁed. The literature has seen two major approaches
to the modelling of fat tails in return series, fat tailed distributions (e.g. the Student–
t) and jump diﬀusion processes. In choosing between those two methodologies, one
must consider the intended applications. The fat tailed distribution approach gener-
ates fat-tailed return series by putting more mass in the tails than the normal does.
Each period’s return therefore is a bit more likely to be in the tail, but intuitively such
realizations in the tails occur “continuously in time.” This is a common assumption
in risk modelling, and often provides more accurate risk forecasts than an assump-
tion of normality. Unfortunately, no consensus exists as to which fat tailed return
distribution should be used, with the Student–t a common choice. Risk modelling
with continuous fat tailed distributions is further hampered by the problem that mul-
tivariate representations of fat tailed distributions either do not exist, are not unique,
or are computationally diﬃcult. The bias in using the square–root–of–time to scale
quantiles in this case is established by Dacorogna et al. (1999) who demonstrate in
theory that if ﬁnancial returns are iid fat tailed but do not follow the stable law, the
square–root–of–time rule overestimates risk.
While fat-tailed distributions may be more suited for day–to–day internal risk manage-
ment, jump diﬀusion models are better suited for the modelling of uncommon one–oﬀ
events, e.g. systemic risk. Jump diﬀusions deﬁne a mostly continuous return process
that is subjected to occasional discrete jumps, and the resulting distribution also ex-
hibites fatter than normal tails. Such models capture rare but large shocks to the
ﬁnancial system over and above the normal day-to-day volatility. In particular, we feel
that jump processes are better suited for the modelling of systemic risk than the contin-
uous approach. Section 2.1 below provides a short survey of the relevant literature on
jumps. Recently, several diﬀerent methods for modeling systemic risk from a ﬁnancial
perspective have been proposed, e.g. Allen and Gale (2000), who model the domino
eﬀect of bank failures in markets with incomplete interactions, Diamond and Rajan
quantile forecast.
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(2001) who model systemic events induced via a liquidity crisis, and Danielsson and
Zigrand (2001), who model systemic risk as arising from externality–induced excessive
risk–taking. Despite being in early stages, what links these approaches is the notion
that the ﬁnancial system experiences a discrete transition from stable to crisis periods,
suggesting that a jump process model, with only downside jumps, is well–suited as a
statistical modelling methodology of systemic risk.
The fear of a systemic crisis is the driving force behind international capital adequacy
regulations, especially after the Asian and Russian-LTCM crises. In fact, the Basel
agreements are motivated by the notion that capital adequacy regulations are not
meant to address day to day risks but rather large systemic events. To quote the
General Manager of the BIS, Crockett (2000) “The quintessential micro–prudential
dictum is that ﬁnancial stability is ensured as long as each and every institution is
sound (. . . ) This statement may strive for too much, because the occasional failure
of individual institutions is not the problem. Trying to avoid such outcomes risks
providing excessive protection, with the result that market disciplinary and allocative
mechanisms are weakened.” This view suggests that supervisors, in designing capital
adequacy regulations, focus primarily on systemic events, where the chosen regulatory
instrument should not be sensitive to day–to–day risks. The balance suggested by the
BIS is to use a particular quantile of the return distribution as the main control for
risk, i.e. the 99% 10 day holding period VaR.3 While deriving bank capital from this
VaR level may reduce systemic risk, in practice it is usually not possible to estimate
the VaR since it requires perhaps a minimum of 300 observations of 10 day returns,
suggesting that 12 years (250 trading days per year) are required for the estimation. As
a result, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) suggests that ﬁnancial
institutions estimate VaR at the daily frequency and scale it up to the 10 day frequency
by
√
10. It is here that the question of the validity of the the square–root–of–time rule
becomes especially pertinent.
Our main ﬁnding is that by applying the square–root–of–time rule to the time scaling
of quantiles of return distributions, risk is underestimated at an increasing rate as
the extrapolation horizon is extended, as the probability of a jump increases or as
the conﬁdence level is raised. In particular, as the scaling horizon increases, the bias
introduced by the square–root–of–time rule grows at a rate faster than time. Since the
3A key objective of this paper is to examine time scaling of the regulatory 99% VaR. Our objective
is not to explore the optimality of the chosen regulatory regime. For instance, Ahn et al. (1999)
and Ju and Pearson (1999) have shown how traders can “game” the VaR, in the former paper via
options strategies, and in the latter paper due to the superior information about VaR that a trader
may have compared to the historically estimated VaR number. We also refer the reader to Artzner
et al. (1999) for a discussion of the incoherence of the VaR measure, and to Basak and Shapiro (2001),
Danielsson and Zigrand (2001) and to Danielsson et al. (2003) for a study of the, sometimes perverse,
eﬀects of VaR regulation in equilibrium models. Instead, here we take them as given, and explore the
implications of a reasonable statistical model of systemic crises for the regulatory VaR measure.
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